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ELECTIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A STATE CANNOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPEL A NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY TO
SELECT ITS DELEGATES IN A MANNER THAT VIOLATES THE PARTY'S
RULES
The rules for the National Democratic Party's (National
Party) 1980 Convention' limited participation in the delegate
selection process to only those who were willing to publicly declare
membership in the party and have their affiliation recorded. 2
Wisconsin law' required that delegates to the national political
conventions vote for Presidential candidates according to the
results of an open primary system in which voters are not required
to publicly declare affiliation before voting. 4 In accordance with
1. Rule 2A of the Democratic Selection Rules for the 1980 National Convention is as follows:
Participation in the delegate selection process in primaries or caucuses shall be
restricted to Democratic voters only who publicly declare their party preference and
have that preference publicly recorded. Documentary evidence of a process which
complies with this rule shall accompany all state Delegate Selection Plans upon their
submission to the National Party. Such rules, when approved by the Compliance
Review Commission and implemented shall constitute adequate provisions within the
meaning of Section 9 of the 1972 Democratic National Convention mandate.
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 109 n.1 (1981)
(quoting Rule 2A of the Democratic Selection Rules).
2. Id. The purpose behind the rules was an effort by the Democratic Party following the turmoil
of the 1968 Convention to broaden the opportunity for participation for those claiming a stake in the
Democratic Party. Id. at 115-16.
3. WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 5.37(4) (West Supp. 1981). This section provides that in primary elections
"the elector may secretly select the party for which he or she wishes to vote. Id. Section
8.12(3)(a) of the Wisconsin statutes provides:
ITIhe specific candidate for president receiving a plurality in any district or in the state
at large is entitled to control all the delegates representing such an area .... As an
alternative to this procedure, the state chairperson of any political party having a
presidential preference ballot may inform the board . . . that the delegates from such
party are to be certified on the basis of proportional representation.
WIS. STAT. ANN. S 8.12(3) (a) (West Supp. 1981).
4. 450 U.S. at 110-11. There are three principal types of primaries - closed, open, and blanket.
The most common type is the closed primary at which only those who meet specified party affiliation
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National Party rules, 5 the Democratic Party of Wisconsin (State
Party) submitted its delegate selection plans, which incorporated
the open primary provisions of the State's election laws, to the
Compliance Review Commission of the National Party. 6 Due to
the conflict between Wisconsin law and the National Party's rules,
the National Party indicated that delegates bound by the results of
Wisconsin's open primary would not be seated at the national
convention.7 The Wisconsin Attorney General subsequently filed
an action on behalf of the State in the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
seeking a declaration that the Wisconsin delegate selection process
was constitutional and enjoining the National Party from refusing
to seat the Wisconsin delegates.8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
entered a judgment upholding the constitutionality of Wisconsin's
law and declaring it binding on the National Party. 9 The National
Party appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court,10
contending that the Wisconsin court's order violated the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution by
prohibiting the Democratic Party from allowing only Democrats to
select the Party's Presidential nominee. 1  The Court noted
probable jurisdiction and stayed the judgment of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.12  The Court held that .a state cannot
constitutionally compel a political party to select its national
convention delegates in a manner that violates the Party's rules.13
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981).
requirements may vote. In the open primary, the voter does not disclose in which party he or she is
voting, but voting is restricted to one party's candidates only. The blanket primary allows the voter
to alternate votes among parties for different offices. See Comment, The Constitutionality qfNon-Mernber
Voting in Political Party Primary Elections, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 259, 260-62 (1978).
5. See supra note I for the relevant National Party rule.
6. 450 U.S. at 112.
7. Id. at 113. Wisconsin delegates to the National Convention were not selected by the
Presidential preference primary, but at separate caucuses. The primary itself, therefore, did not
violate the National Party's rules, but the requirement that the primary vote would determine
delegate votes for Presidential candidates at the convention did. Id. at 120-21.
8. State ex rel. LaFollette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d
519 (1980). The named respondents to the suit were the Democratic National Party and the
Democratic National Committee (National Party) and the Democratic Party of Wisconsin (State
Party). Id. at 480, 287 N.W.2d at 521. The State Party joined the State of Wisconsin as an appellee
in the United States Supreme Court case. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 113.
9. 93 Wis. 2d at 482, 287 N.W.2d at 522. The Wisconsin court reasoned that the State had a
compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the nominating process and providing for the
privacy of voter political preferences. In contrast, the burden on the associational rights of the
National Party was not unconstitutional because the delegates themselves were not selected by the
open primary system. In addition, the court noted that no factual support was presented to show that
the open primary differs significantly from closed primaries in terms of who participates. Id. at 483,
287 N.W.2d at 522.
10. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 114.
11. Brief for Appellants at 2, Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
12. 450 U.S. at 114.
13. Id. at 121. There was a dissenting opinion written by Justice Powell with which Justice
Blackmun and justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 126.
CASE COMMENT
The United States Constitution makes no reference to political
parties or to the nominating procedures for Presidential candidates.
Instead, the power to choose the President and Vice President is
vested in the electoral college. 14  The Constitution grants
legislatures complete discretion to select the method for appointing
electors.' 5  While electors may be appointed directly by the
legislature, 16 elected by districts, 7  or voted for on a statewide
basis,18 the latter is the method used by every state today.' 9 The
framers of the Constitution expected the electors to be wise and
dispassionate men who would exercise independent judgment. 2
This ideal was never realized, however, because the electors
quickly became little more than rubber stamps for political party
decisions. 21 By 1796, political parties had formed and congressional
caucuses picked the Presidential candidates.2 2 The congressional
caucus system continued until the 1820's, when it gave way to an
era of egalitarianism that resulted in Presidential nominations by
national political conventions. 23
Until recently, the principal method for selecting candidates
for office and delegates to national political conventions was
14. See U.S. CONST. amend XII. This amendment reads in part as follows:
The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state
with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the persons voted for as President,
and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President....
Id.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. II, D1, cl. 2. Clause two reads as follows:
Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a
number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to
which the state may be entitled in the Congress; but no senator or representative, or
person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an elector.
Id.
16. W. SAYRE & .1. PARRIS, VOTING FOR PRESIDENT 28 (1970). South Carolina's electors, for
example, were appointed by the state legislature until 1860. Id.
17. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892). The Court upheld a Michigan law providing
for the election of electors by district. The Court dismissed the challer.ge to the legislature's authority
to establish districts by noting that even though the authority to select electors had been delegated to
the popular vote of the electorate, the Constitution allowed for selection of electors by any means
chosen by the legislature. Id. at 35-36. McPherson contains an extensive history of the early methods
used by states to choose electors. See id. at 25-35.
18. Id. at 25.
19. W. SAYRE &.1. PARRIS, VOTING FOR PRESIDENT 28 (1970).
20. N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT 63 (1968). See A. HAMiLTON,.J. MADISON &J.JAY, THE
FEDERALIST No. 68 (New York 1788) (Alexander Hamilton's rationale for the electoral college
system).
21. See PEIRCE, supra note 20, at 63.
22. Id. The electors were selected after the congressional caucuses chose their Presidential
candidates and these electors merely ratified the earlier decision of their political party. Id.
23. Id. at 113. The impetus for this change came from the supporters of frontier democracy who
succeeded in killing the caucus system by nominating Andrew .Jackson for President in 1824. The
first national nominating conventions were held prior to the 1832 Presidential election. Id.
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through state party conventions. 24 In the early part of the twentieth
century, however, states passed laws to regulate political parties by
requiring that primaries be held 25 in a prescribed manner as a
means to reform what was viewed as a corrupt convention system
dominated by boss rule. 26 Several states also adopted Presidential
preference primaries. 27 In the 1980 election the number of states
conducting Presidential preference primaries grew to thirty-five.28
In Newberry v. United States29  the Supreme Court first
considered the issue of whether primaries were elections subject to
regulations by Congress. 30 The Newberry Court held primaries "are
in no sense elections for an office, but merely methods by which
party adherents agree upon candidates.' '31 Twenty years later the
Court reversed this position and stated in United States v. Classic32
that "[wlhere the state law has made the primary an integral part
of the procedure of choice ... the right of the elector to have his
ballot counted at the primary is likewise included in the right
protected by Article I, §2.1,33 The Court has continued to view the
party primary as "not merely an exercise or warm-up for the
general election, but an integral part of the entire election proc-
ess. . . ."34 The Court also has considered state regulation of
24. Note, The Party 4ffiliation Requirenent: A Constitutional Inquiry, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 71, 75
(1980). The state nominating convention was the principal means of selecting candidates from about
1825-1910. Id.
25. Id. The first primary was held in Pennsylvania in the 1840's and the primary is now used to
nominate candidates for state office in every state. Id.
26. State ex rel. LaFollette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 93 Wis. 2d at 492, 287
N.W.2d at 527. The Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted progressive reformer Robert M. LaFollette,
Sr. on the subject of primaries as follows:
No longer . . . will there stand between the voter and the official a political machine
with a complicated system of caucuses and conventions, by the easy manipulation of
which it thwarts the will of the voter and rules official conduct. . . . If the voter is
competent to cast his ballot at the general election for the official of his choice, he is
equally competent to vote directly at the primary election for the nomination of the
candidates of his party....
Id.
27. Id. at 493, 287 N.W.2d at 527. Wisconsin, for example, amended its 1903 primary law in
1905 to make it apply to selection of national convention delegates. Id.
28. Council of State Governments, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-1981, at 53 (1980).
29. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
30. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. at 250. The Newberry Court held a law limiting the
amount of money that could be expended in a congressional or senatorial election to be
unconstitutional as applied to a primary election because the constitutional grant of authority to
Congress to regulate elections did not include primary elections. Id.
31. Id.
32. 313 U.S. 299(1941).
33. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318. In United States v. Classic the issue was whether the
right to vote and have one's vote counted in a primary election was a right secured by the
Constitution. Classic involved prosecution for alleged election fraud by Louisiana election officials.
Id. at 307-08.
34. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974). In Storer the Court denied a constitutional
challenge to a California election provision that barred candidates from filing as independents for the
general election ballot if they had been affiliated with a qualified party within one year of the
immediately preceding primary election. The Court said this provision was similar in purpose to the
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primary elections as necessary and constitutionally permissible to
protect the right to vote by ensuring fair and orderly procedures. 3 5
Although states have authority to regulate elections, the Court
has recognized that political parties and voters have the
constitutional right of association 6 founded on the first amendment
rights of free speech and assembly.3 7 Thus, the Court has held
restrictive ballot access statutes 38 and burdensome party affiliation
statutes 9 to be unconstitutional infringements of associational
rights. 40
The conflict between a national political party's associational
rights and a state's authority to protect the integrity of its elections
arose in the case of Cousins v. Wigoda. 41 The case involved a dispute
over the seating of Illinois delegates to the 1972 National
Democratic Convention. 42  The Wigoda delegates, who were
elected from Chicago districts at the primary election, were
challenged successfully before the party's credentials committee by
the Cousins delegates, who had been chosen at private caucuses. 43
law that prohibits defeated primary candidates from running in the general election. The Court
noted that the primary serves an important function in settling intraparty feuds and winnowing out
candidates. Id.
35. Id. at 730. The court stated that "there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they
are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes." Id.
36. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). Sweezy involved the appellant's
refusal to testify before a state attorney general's inquiry regarding his knowledge of members of the
Progressive Party in New Hampshire. The Court held that this was an invasion of his first and
fourteenth amendment liberties of free political expression. The Court stated that "[olur form of
government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political
expression and association." Id.
37. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Court stated the
following: "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." Id.
38. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Williams involved a challenge to Ohio's
restrictive ballot access provisions that required new parties to file petitions with signatures equal to
at least 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Id. at 25. In
addition, these petitions had to be filed by February of the election year in order for a new party to
get on the ballot. The Supreme Court stated: "In the present situation the state laws place burdens
on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights - the right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." Id- at 30.
39. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). In Kusper the Court held that an Illinois
statute that prohibited appellee from voting in a party primary because she had voted in another
party's primary during the preceding 23 months unconstitutionally abridged her freedom of
association. Id. at 53. But see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). In Rosario the Court
upheld a New York law that required enrollment in a party 11 months before a primary. Id. at 758.
40. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30. The Court in Williams stated the following:
"We have repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment." Id. ; see
also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 56-57. In Kusper the Court stated that "[tihere can no longer be
any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and
ideas is ... protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
41. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
42. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 479-80 (1975).
43. Id. The credentials committee determined that the Wigoda delegates had been chosen in
violation of party guidelines relating to participation by minorities, youth, and women; public notice
requirements; and slate-making procedures. Id. at 479 n. 1.
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Despite an Illinois Circuit Court order enjoining the Cousins group
from serving as delegates, they were seated by the Convention and
later charged with criminal contempt.44 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Appellate Court, which upheld
the injunction and gave primacy to state law over the party's
rules.45 The Court held that the State did not show a compelling
interest sufficient to justify infringement of the associational rights
of the delegates and the National Party.4 6 The Court minimized the
State's interest in the integrity of the electoral process by noting
that the election was a primary to elect delegates to a national polit-
ical convention rather than a general election.47 In light of the
important functions of delegates, including the selection of a
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidate, the Court reasoned
that state regulation would undercut this vital process.48 The
concurrence by.Justice Rehnquist stressed that the injunction "was
as direct and severe an infringement of the right of association as
can be conceived. "9
The Court in Cousins made it clear that a national political
party's right of association in the delegate selection process could
not be abridged without a showing of a compelling state interest. 50
Nevertheless, the extent to which national political parties were
exempt from state election laws was not clearly defined.51 The
44. Id. at 480-81. The criminal contempt charges were stayed pending the United States
Supreme Court decision. Id. at 481.
45. Id. at 483. The Illinois Appellate Court stated that "[tihe law of the state is supreme and
party rules to the contrary are of no effect. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 475, 302
N.E.2d 614, 627 (1973).
46. 419 U.S. at 491. In Cousins the Court said that it was intimating no views on whether a
national political party's decisions constitute state action. The Court further stated that it was
expressing no view on whether national political parties are subject to one person-one vote
requirements of the reapportionment decisions, or whether national political parties and conventions
are regulable by Congress. Id. at 483-84 n.4.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. The Court viewed the delegates' task of nominating the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates as one of "supreme importance." Id. at 489. The Court stated: "The States
themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates." Id. at 489-90.
49. Id. at 491 (Rehnquist, .J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist was joined in his concurrence by
Chief.Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. Id. The concurrence expressed concern about the broad
language used in the Court's opinion. Id. at 492. For example, the concurrence took issue with the
majority's contention that the states play no constitutional role in the Presidential selection process.
Id. at 489-90..Justice Powell agreed that Illinois could not compel the National Democratic Party to
seat the respondents as delegates, but said the state "has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens
from being represented by delegates who have been rejected by these citizens in a democratic election."
Id. at 497 (Powell,.J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 489.
51. Id. In Cousins the Court found that the state's interests did not justify issuing an injunction
prohibiting the National Party from seating any of the Cousins delegates. The Court noted also that
the injunction would not effectuate the state interest of ensuring that the primary winners, the
Wigoda delegates, would be seated. Id. at 488. One court interpreting the holding in Cousins viewed
the severity of the injunction as important in determining how broadly to read the decision. See
Fallon v. State Bd. of Elections of State of New York, 408 F. Supp. 636, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In
Fallon the court stated that under the most liberal reading, Cousins "held no more than that the policy
of a national political party in setting qualifications for delegates to its convention may, in some
circumstances, prevail over contrary state law." Id.
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Court was given another opportunity to clarify the balancing of
associational rights with state interests in fair election procedures in
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette. 52 In
LaFollette the State of Wisconsin argued that its interests in
conducting an open primary were compelling, that its regulations
were closely drawn, and that the law did not unduly burden the
National Party's associational rights. 53 The Court rejected these
contentions, holding that a state cannot constitutionally compel a
national political party to select its delegates in a manner that
violates the party's rules.
5 4
The Court in LaFollette began its analysis by reviewing the
conflict between the National Party rules and Wisconsin state
law.55 Even though delegates were not elected at Wisconsin's open
primary, the Court determined that the Wisconsin law binding the
delegates to vote in accordance with the Presidential preferences of
primary voters conflicted with the "delegate selection process" as
defined by National Party rules. 56 The Court proceeded to consider
at length the origin and purpose behind the National Party rules
limiting participation in the delegate selection process to publicly
declared Democrats only. 57 The National Party's concern with
participation in the delegate selection process stemmed from the
underrepresentation of rank and file party members at the 1968
Democratic National Convention. 58
The LaFollette Court determined that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had incorrectly construed the issue to be whether the
Wisconsin open primary law was constitutional by serving a
compelling interest in encouraging voter participation.5 9  The
52. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
53. Brief for Appellee State of Wisconsin at 5-8, Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin exrel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
54. 450 U.S. at 121.
55. Id. at 109-12. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 109-10. The Court stated that according to National Party rules, "the 'delegate
selection process' includes any procedure by which delegates to the Convention are bound to vote for
the nomination of particular candidates." Id. at 110.
57. Id. at 115-20. Between 1968 and 1975 the National Democratic Party directed three separate
commissions to study the problem of participation in the Presidential selection process. Id. at 116-
19.
58. Id. at 155. Following the 1968 Convention, the National Party organized a Committee on
Party Structure and Delegate Selection (McGovern/Frazer Commission) to study how to make the
Presidential nominating process more open and representative of rank and file Democrats. Id. The
study concluded that the procedures must be open to all Democrats but cautioned that their
participation would be diluted if members of other parties also were allowed to participate. Id. The
guidelines developed by the McGovern/Frazer Commission were followed by recommendations of
two other commissions organized by the National Party that led to adoption of the rule restricting
participation in delegate selection to publicly declared Democrats only. Id. at 117.
59. Id. at 120-21. After balancing the associational rights of the National Party and its adherents
against the State's interest in the integrity of the nominating process, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
concluded: "We determine that Wisconsin has a compelling state interest in having a primary and in
not requiring that voters publicly declare their party preference and have that preference publicly
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Court in LaFollette said it need not address this issue because the
National Party rules did not challenge a state's authority to conduct
an open primary, so long as the results of the primary were not
binding on delegates to the national convention. 60 Therefore, the
LaFollette Court viewed the issue to be "whether the State may
compel the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that
violates the rules of the Party," ' 61 an issue the Court said was
resolved by Cousins v. Wigoda.62
The LaFollette Court reaffirmed that the National Party and its
members have a right of political association protected from state
infringement by the first and fourteenth amendments. 63 The Court
also noted that the right of association includes the right to identify
members and limit the association accordingly. 64 The Court cited
Rosario v. Rockefeller,65 a case in which the Court upheld a party
enrollment requirement, as an example of the Court's recognition
that a political party's decisions could be seriously distorted if not
protected from the influence of unaffiliated persons. 66 The LaFollette
Court rejected the State's contention that the burden on the
National Party was only minor by noting "a State, or a court may
not constitutionally substitute its judgment for that of the Party. "67
In considering whether the State had demonstrated a
compelling interest, the Court said the State's identified interests 68
recorded." State ex rel. Lafollette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 93 Wis. 2d at 483, 287
N.W.2d at 522.
60. Democratic Party ofthe United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 120 n. 21.
The Court stated:
The National Party nowhere indicated that the Wisconsin primary cannot be open; it
averred only that any process adopted by the State that binds the National Party must
comply with Party rules .... The National Party said only that if Wisconsin does not
change its primary laws by requiring public party declaration consistent with Party
rules, it would be satisfied with some other, Party-run, delegate selection system that
did comply with Party rules.
Id. (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id. (citing 419 U.S. 477 (1975)). The dissent in LaFollette viewed the facts in the case,
however, to be substantially different from those in Cousins. Justice Powell stated: "In contrast with
the direct state regulation of the delegate-selection process at issue in Cousins, this case involves a
state statutory scheme that regulates delegate selection only indirectly." 450 U.S. at 129 (Powell, .J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 121-22. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
64. Id. at 122. The Court noted a commentator's discussion of the freedom of association:
"Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over
their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie the association's
being." Id. at 122 n. 22 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 791 (1978)) (footnote
omitted).
65. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
66. 450 U.S. at 122.
67. Id. at 123-24. The Court stated that the State Party's contentions that empirical data did not
demonstrate the need for the National Party's rule requiring public declaration should be directed to
the national party rather than the courts. Id. at 124 n. 27.
68. Id. at 124-25. The Court summarized the interests of the state as identified by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as follows: "The State asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity
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related to the conduct of the Presidential preference primary69 and
not to binding the votes of delegates selected in a separate process. 70
The Court also summarily dismissed the State's claim to authority
to regulate Presidential preference choices under the constitutional
power of states to choose Presidential electors7 1 by calling it too
remote.7 2 The Court concluded by indicating that both the State
and the National Party had substantial interests that could be
preserved by allowing Wisconsin to continue its open primary, but
not require Wisconsin delegates to national political conventions to
be bound by the results. 73
Like the decision in Cousins, the LaFollette holding is limited to
the context of a state's attempted regulation of the delegate
selection process of a national party. The implication of the
decision, however, is that state laws regulating national and state
political parties and members will be subject to increasing
constitutional attack as infringing on important associational
rights. The LaFollette decision makes it clear that the Court fully
intends to protect the broad right of association articulated in
Cousins. 74 Although state regulation of state party affairs75 would
likely be viewed as more compelling and less burdensome than
regulation of a national party's activities, 76 courts will be faced with
of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries,
and preventing harassment of voters." Id. (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 125. The Court acknowledged by citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941),
that a state has important interests in regulating primary elections. 450 U.S. at 124 n. 28.
70. Id. at 125. The dissent maintained that by removing the nonbinding character of the
Presidential preference primary, the state's very purpose in giving control of the nominating process
to individual voters was destroyed. Id. at 134 (Powell,.]., dissenting).
71. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
72. 450 U.S. at 125 n. 31. The Court stated: "Any connection between the process of selecting
electors and the means by which political party members in a State associate to elect delegates to
party nominating conventions is so remote and tenuous as to be wholly without constitutional
significance." Id.
73. Id. at 126. After recognizing the substantial interests of both the State of Wisconsin and the
National Party, the Court stated:
But these interests are not incompatible, and to the extent they clash in this case, both
interests can be preserved. The National Party rules do not forbid Wisconsin from
conducting an open primary. But if Wisconsin does open its primary, it cannot require
that Wisconsin delegates to the National Party convention vote there in accordance
with the primary results, if to do so would violate Party rules.
Id.
74. See 419 U.S. at 489-90. The Cousins Court described the functions performed by national
convention delegates to be "of supreme importance to every citizen of the Nation regardless of their
State of residence." Id. at 489.
75. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979). The Marchioro Court upheld a Washington
statute that requires political parties to have a State Committee composed of two persons from each
county in the state. The Court found no substantial burden on associational rights because the State
Convention rather than the State Committee is the governing body ofthe party. Id. at 193.
76. See 419 U.S. at 490. In Cousins the Court placed emphasis on the "pervasive national
interest" served by the delegates to a national convention and indicated that it would be too
burdensome on a national party to have the eligibility of delegates determined by each of the fifty
states. Id.
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difficult problems of determining when regulation of a state party
infringes the associational rights of a national party.
The holding in LaFollette directly conflicts with the state open
Presidential preference primary law of North Dakota. " The effect
of the LaFollette Court's holding is to render North Dakota's
Presidential preference primary, which was to be used for the first
time in the 1984 election,78 nonbinding on the state's national
political convention delegates.7 9 Therefore, the North Dakota
Legislature has at least four options available. First, the legislature
can proceed to hold the Presidential preference primary with the
open statewide primary, provided the results are not binding on
national political convention delegates.80 Several states conducted
such "beauty contests" in 1980.81 Second, the legislature can hold
the Presidential preference primary in conjunction with the
statewide primary, but require voters to publicly declare party
affiliation as a prerequisite. This would comply with National Party
rules,8 2 but the change might be viewed as unacceptable by many
North Dakota voters who prefer to keep their party preference a
secret. Third, the legislature can authorize a Presidential
preference primary separate from the open statewide primary,
requiring voters in the Presidential preference primary to publicly
declare their party affiliation. This option would satisfy the
77. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-04 (1981). Section 16.1-11-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code specifies that the Presidential preference primary held in conjunction with the open statement
primary shall bind the votes of delegates to the national party conventions. Id. Section 16.1-11-04
reads in part:
The delegates selected by political parties shall be bound to cast their first ballots at the
party national convention in such a manner that each candidate at the party's
presidential preference primary receives a proportion of the total votes cast by the
delegates equal to the proportion received by that candidate of the total votes cast for
all candidates for president of that party at the primary.
Id.
78. 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 276. The law establishing the Presidential preference primary
also changed the date of the statewide primary election from the first Tuesday in September to the
second Tuesday in.June. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-11-01 (1981).
79. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The decision to move North Dakota's
statewide primary from September back to June was based, in part, on the interest in holding a
Presidential preference primary before the national political conventions. This point was made by
the sponsor of the legislation, State Senator Raymon Holmberg, who stated in testimony before the
North Dakota Senate Judiciary Committee that a Presidential preference primary is worthless
without an early date. Hearings on Senate Bill 2340 Before the North Dakota Senate Committee onjudiciary,
46th Legislative Assembly (Jan. 31, 1979).
80. See MONT. CODE ANN. §13-10-407 (1981) (example of a statute that provides for a
nonbinding Presidential preference primary). Section 13-10-407 reads as follows: "The method of
selection of delegates to national presidential nominating conventions is to be set by party rules. The
use of the results of the presidential preference primary election by the political parties in their
delegation selection systems is discretionary and is to be determined by party rules. Id. "
81. 23 STATE Gov'T NEWS 18 (1980). The states holding nonbinding Presidential preference
primaries were Idaho, Michigan, and Vermont. Id.
82. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 133
(Powell, .J., dissenting). Justice Powell pointed out that an immediate public declaration before
voting, which some states permit, would satisfy the National Party rules. Id.
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National Party rules and retain the traditional open statewide
primary. It would add another costly election, however, and still
require North Dakota voters to publicly declare party preference in
order to vote in a primary election. Finally, the legislature can
choose to repeal the Presidential preference primary entirely. This
alternative would allow retention of the open statewide primary
and create the least potential for conflict with the rules of the
national political parties.
In deciding ways election laws should be amended to conform
to the associational rights of the national parties, states will have to
be cognizant that the rules of the national parties may conflict and
be subject to change. Therefore, the holding in LaFollette implies
that states should keep their involvement in the affairs of a national
political party to a minimum.
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